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When “Humanitarianism” Becomes “Development”:
The Politics of International Aid in Syria’s Palestinian
Refugee Camps
Nell Gabiam
ABSTRACT In recent years, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA) has attempted to go beyond its role as a provider of relief and basic services in Palestinian refugee camps
and emphasize its role as a development agency. In this article, I focus on the Neirab Rehabilitation Project, an
UNRWA-sponsored development project taking place in the Palestinian refugee camps of Ein el Tal and Neirab in
northern Syria. I argue that UNRWA’s role as a relief-centered humanitarian organization highlights the everyday
suffering of Palestinian refugees, suffering that has become embedded in refugees’ political claims. I show that
UNRWA’s emphasis on “development” in the refugee camps is forcing Palestinian refugees in Ein el Tal and Neirab
to reassess the political narrative through which they have understood their relationship with UNRWA. [humanitari-
anism, development, UNRWA, Palestine, refugee camps]
RESUME Depuis quelques anne´es, l’UNRWA, (Office de secours et de travaux des Nations Unies pour les re´fugie´s
de Palestine dans le Proche-Orient) s’efforce d’aller au dela` de son roˆle de fournisseur d’aide et services de
premie`re ne´cessite´ dans les camps de re´fugie´s palestiniens et de mettre l’accent sur son roˆle en tant qu’agence
de de´veloppement. A travers l’e´tude du Projet de Rehabilitation de Neirab (« Neirab Rehabilitation Project »), pour
lequel l’UNRWA intervient dans deux camps du Nord de la Syrie (Ein el Tal et Neirab), cet article vise a` montrer ce
processus de transformation. Alors que le roˆle de l’UNRWA en tant qu’organisation humanitaire de´die´e au secours
met en lumie`re la souffrance quotidienne des re´fugie´s palestiniens, une souffrance qui a e´te´ pleinement inte´gre´e
dans leurs revendications politiques, l’accent mis re´cemment sur le «de´veloppement» dans les camps force les
re´fugie´s de Ein el Tal et Neirab a` reconside´rer le discours politique a` travers lequel ils avaient de´fini leur relation avec
l’UNRWA.
In the summer of 2009, I returned to Ein el Tal andNeirab,two Palestinian refugee camps in Northern Syria, where I
had conducted fieldwork some three years earlier. Ein el Tal
andNeirab have, since 2000, become the target of theNeirab
Rehabilitation Project, a UN Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East–sponsored sustainable
development project (hereafter, UNRWA). My first stop
was Ein el Tal, where the initial phase of the project had
recently been completed. This initial phase entailed moving
300 Palestinian families from former World War II army
barracks located in Neirab Camp to brand new UNRWA-
built houses in the neighboring Palestinian refugee
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camp of Ein el Tal. As I was walking through Ein el Tal’s
barren hilly area where the new UNRWA-built houses are
located, a giant mural on the side of one of the houses,
strategically looking down on the rest of the camp, caught
my attention (see Figure 1). Among themore striking scenes
painted on the mural were a group of fleeing refugees, a
Palestinian woman dressed in traditional garb desperately
hugging an olive tree, a giant hand holding what appears to
be a land deed with the words not for sale stamped on it, the
Dome of the Rock mosque in Jerusalem, and a young girl
wearing a red headband with the word Palestine written on
it, holding a stone in her raised fist. At the top right-hand
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FIGURE 1. Mural in Ein el Tal. (Photo taken by author)
corner of the mural, accompanied by an awkwardly worded
English translation, were the followingwords in giant Arabic
letters: al-‘awda haqq . . . la-‘awda ‘anh [Return is a right . . .
It cannot be forsaken] (translation by author).
The mural, which was painted by a Palestinian artist
living in Ein el Tal in May of 2009, roughly nine years after
the official start of the Neirab Rehabilitation Project, re-
flects the local sense of anxiety that has accompanied the
implementation of the project. It attests to the contro-
versial nature of UNRWA’s recent attempt to emphasize
“development” in Palestinian refugee camps. I argue that
UNRWA’s recent emphasis on development has been con-
troversial with Palestinian refugees for the following reason:
Palestinian refugees—who, as a collective, have always in-
sisted on their right of return to their Palestinian homes
(Al Husseini and Bocco 2010; Schiff 1995)—have come to
conceive of the relief-centered humanitarian aid provided
by UNRWA as a right, as proof of international respon-
sibility for their predicament, and as a reminder that the
international community has yet to find a political solution
to this predicament.1 UNRWA’s discourse of development,
based on the notions of encouraging refugees “to become
self reliant” and ending “refugee dependence on assistance”
(UNRWA 2005:12), destabilizes such a narrative and, from
the perspective of Palestinian refugees in Ein el Tal and
Neirab, threatens to create a situation where “development”
becomes an alternative to solving the refugee issue through
a political process.
The point of this article is not to imply that “develop-
ment” is depoliticizing while humanitarian aid is not; neither
is it to argue for an oppositional relationship between Pales-
tinian refugees and “development.” Rather, it is to show that
UNRWA’s relief-centered humanitarianism speaks to the
sense of victimhood of Palestinian refugees and that the suf-
fering associated with this sense of victimhood has become
embedded in Palestinian refugees’ political claims concern-
ing the right of return. In contrast, UNRWA-sponsored
“development,” the purported goal of which is to overcome
Palestinian refugees’ material suffering, unsettles the politi-
cal narrative through which Palestinian refugees have inter-
preted their relationship with UNRWA and forces refugees
to reconfigure themselves as political subjects in terms of
their relationship with the agency. As I will show in this
article, an important aspect of understanding the evolving
dynamics of UNRWA–refugee relations is the fact that the
great majority of Palestinian UNRWA employees are them-
selves Palestinian refugees.
The arguments I make in this article have broader im-
plications in terms of scholarly attempts to understand the
relationship between suffering and politics. UNRWA’s em-
brace of “development” is happening at a timewhen suffering
has become an important arena for making political claims
(Benbassa 2010; Brown 1995; Fassin 2002; Ticktin 2006).
UNRWA’s attempted shift toward development as its main
approach to assisting Palestinian refugees and the reactions
of Palestinian refugees to this shift present an opportunity to
reflect on whether group-based political claims can be artic-
ulated in ways that transcend the suffering that engendered
these claims in the first place.
I would like to clarify from the outset that when I talk
about Palestinian insistence on the right of return, I am
pointing to a transgenerational discourse articulated by the
greatmajority of Palestinian refugeeswithwhom I interacted
during my fieldwork in Syria. This discourse insists that
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Palestinian refugees should have the right to return to their
Palestinian homes (see Al Husseini and Bocco 2010 and
Dumper 2007, both ofwhommake a similar argument about
Palestinian refugees in general). To what extent Palestinian
refugees would actually choose to return to their former
homes if given the possibility is a separate issue that goes
beyond the scope of the arguments I am making in this
article.
Most of the ethnographic evidence presented in this ar-
ticle is the result of fieldwork conducted from the spring
of 2004 to the spring of 2006 in the Palestinian refugee
camps of Ein el Tal, Neirab, and Yarmouk, all located in
Syria. During much of that time, I was involved in UNRWA
activities on a volunteer basis. From the fall of 2004 to the
middle of the spring of 2005, I taught in UNRWA’s conver-
sational English program for UNRWA employees (Pales-
tinians for the most part) at the agency’s headquarters in
Damascus. From the spring of 2005 to the spring of 2006,
I worked as an UNRWA volunteer in connection with the
Neirab Rehabilitation Project taking place in Ein el Tal and
Neirab. I assisted the Neirab Rehabilitation Project team
as an Arabic-to-English translator during informal meetings
with Palestinian refugees in Neirab and Ein el Tal and served
as a note taker duringUNRWA-organized communitymeet-
ings and focus group discussions (these discussions involved
groups of adult men, adult women, boys, and girls). In the
fall of 2005, I participated in anUNRWA-sponsored study of
living conditions inNeirabCamp’s barracks,which consisted
of a questionnaire and formal interviews with 24 families liv-
ing in the barracks. These activities, which enabled me to
engage in a considerable amount of participant-observation,
were supplemented by approximately 30 formal interviews
with Palestinians of varying age, occupation, and gender liv-
ing in Ein el Tal, Neirab, and Yarmouk.2 I also conducted
about a dozen formal interviews with UNRWA staff (both
foreign and Palestinian) directly involved in the Neirab Re-
habilitation Project and interviewed two Syrian government
representatives involved in the project (who in this casewere
themselves Palestinian refugees).
PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN SYRIA
During the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, roughly 700 thousand
Palestinian Arabs fled their homes or (in a few cases) were
expelled through direct Israeli orders.3 They were actively
prevented from returning to their homes by Israeli authori-
ties once hostilities had subsided.4 In this sense, “it may fairly
be said that all 700,000 or so [Palestinian Arabs] who ended
up as refugees were compulsorily displaced or expelled”
(Morris 2004:589). Since then, the Israeli government has
opposed the collective return of these refugees and their
descendents to their original homes (Morris 2004).
Of the Palestinians who became refugees, approxi-
mately 90–100 thousand ended up in Syria (Kodmani-
Darwish 1997; Takkenberg 1998). The Syrian government
has had a relatively welcoming approach toward Palestinian
refugees (Kodmani-Darwish 1997).5 On January 25, 1949,
the Syrian government created the Bureau for Palestinian
Arab Refugees, which later became known as the General
Authority for Palestinian Arab Refugees (GAPAR). GAPAR
is the main Syrian government body that engages with
Palestinian refugees, and it maintains an active presence in
Palestinian refugee camps. In 1956, the Syrian government
adopted Law No. 260, which states:
Palestinians residing in Syria as of the date of the publication of this
law are to be considered as originally Syrian in all things covered
by the law and legally valid regulations connected with the right to
employment, commerce, and national service, while preserving
their original nationality. [Brand 1988:623]6
Despite extending the great majority of Syrian civil rights
to Palestinian refugees through Law No. 260, the Syrian
government officially opposes the permanent resettlement
of Palestinian refugees on its territory, insisting that the only
acceptable solution for these refugees is return. In fact, the
Syrian government vetoed an earlier UNRWA proposal in
the 1990s to rebuild the area where Neirab’s barracks are
located, fearing that supporting such a project would give
the impression that it considered the presence of Palestinian
refugees on its soil to be permanent (see Misselwitz and
Hanafi 2010). However, the Syrian government changed
course in 2000 and has even become a participant in the
Neirab Rehabilitation Project, donating land adjacent to Ein
el Tal Camp for the construction of new houses for families
moving out of Neirab’s barracks, extending electricity and
water services to the new housing and building a sewage
system in Ein el Tal Camp.
The Syrian government’s policy change can be at-
tributed, at least in part, to repeated UNRWA efforts to
get the Syrian government’s endorsement for the Neirab
Rehabilitation Project as well as the fact that, in the late
1990s, GAPAR acquired a new director (himself a Pales-
tinian refugee) who, contrary to his predecessor (also a
Palestinian refugee), became sympathetic toUNRWA’s pro-
posal. GAPAR’s new (and current) director played a crucial
role in convincing the Syrian government’s upper echelons
to endorse the project. According to a UNRWA employee
who was involved with the early phase of the Neirab Re-
habilitation Project, GAPAR’s current director was able to
get the support of Syrian authorities by successfully convinc-
ing them that camp improvement initiatives did not have to
prejudice the Palestinian right of return or be tantamount
to settlement.7 A speech given by GAPAR’s current direc-
tor, a boisterous middle-aged man, in November of 2005 in
Neirab Camp gives some insight into the director’s way of
reconciling “development” in the host country with the goal
of refugee return. Addressing a crowd made up of refugees
from Ein el Tal and Neirab, he pointed to the harsh living
conditions encountered in Neirab’s zinc-covered barracks.
He reminded the crowd that GAPAR had turned down
“20 million Euros” of foreign-aid money in 1994 that would
have gone into improving living conditions in Neirab. “Why
does every improvement in our life have to be considered
settlement?” he asked. “Would we [GAPAR] agree with the
project if it were about settlement?” As for the right of
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return, “It is untouchable. It is something that you own and
that will be passed on from generation to generation.” He
ended his speech by saying, “We [Palestinian refugees] will
not be able to return without first developing ourselves so
that we can be resilient. This is how we understand [the
Neirab Rehabilitation Project]. It does not compromise the
right of return” (field notes, November 8, 2005).
According to UNRWA statistics, only a third of Pales-
tinian refugees in Syria live in camps (UNRWA 2011).
However, the issue is more complex given that Palestinian
refugees who did not initially move to areas that were offi-
cially delimited as UNRWA-administered camps were en-
couraged by the Syrian government to live in areas set aside
for them. In practice, UNRWA recognizes these areas as
camps (albeit unofficial ones) and provides services to them
but does not include them in its statistical information about
Palestinian camp populations. For instance, UNRWA con-
siders Ein el Tal to be an unofficial camp. Ein el Tal Camp
was established by the Syrian government in 1962 to ac-
commodate Palestinian refugees renting housing in various
parts of Aleppo, Syria’s second largest city, situated in the
north of the country. If the camp is understood primarily
as a physically circumscribed ethnonational community of
people who claim refugee status then one can argue that the
majority (about two thirds) of registered Palestinian refugees
in Syria live in camps.
UNRWA AND PALESTINIAN REFUGEES
Before the establishment of UNRWA, Palestinian refugees
were under the mandate of the United Nations Conciliation
Commission for Palestine (UNCCP), which was created in
December of 1948 and consists of the governments of the
United States, France, and Turkey.8 Having recognized the
right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and
receive compensation for their lost or damaged property
through the adoption of Resolution 194 (United Nations
1948), the United Nations expected the UNCCP to engage
in political mediation that would end the Israeli–Palestinian
conflict and result in a solution for displaced Palestinian
refugees.9 Today, UN Resolution 194 has become a corner-
stone of Palestinian refugee advocacy for return. The right
of return of individuals who have been displaced from their
normal place of residence is a right that is also recognized in
customary international law, the four Geneva conventions,
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dumper
2007; Takkenberg 1998).
UNRWAwas established in December of 1949 to focus
on emergency relief assistance to Palestinian refugees and to
initiate a “programme of public works” while the UNCCP
continued to mediate Israeli–Palestinian peace negotiations
(Dumper 2007; Schiff 1995:20). The “public works” initia-
tive included small-scale projects such as road building, tree
planting, and economic assistance for refugees to set up small
businesses as well as large-scale regional water development
projects (Schiff 1995).10 Although this was never officially
acknowledged by UNRWA, the goal of the “public works”
initiative was to bring about the resettlement of refugees
in their host country through economic development as an
alternative to return (Schiff 1995). The program failed and
was abandoned in the late 1950s because of resistance from
Palestinian refugees and Arab host states who suspected that
the program’s economic development schemes were be-
ing planned as an alternative to refugee repatriation (Schiff
1995). UNRWA went back to focusing on its emergency
relief efforts (consisting in providing refugees with food,
shelter, clothing, and basic health care) and strengthening
its education program (Takkenberg 2010). In the 1990s,
UNRWA attempted again—this time successfully—to tar-
get the long-term economic welfare of Palestinian refugees
by instituting a microfinance program (Takkenberg 2010).
UNRWA also introduced shelter rehabilitation, water, and
sanitation projects in Palestinian refugee camps around that
time (Takkenberg 2010). “Development,” then, is not en-
tirely new toUNRWA; it is part of a fraught history between
the agency and Palestinian refugees. What is different today
is UNRWA’s open embrace of “development” as an ideol-
ogy and UNRWA’s attempt to frame its relationship with
Palestinian refugees through this ideology.
It is important to note that UNCCP’s activities came to
a standstill in the mid-1950s because it was unable to medi-
ate a political resolution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.
In addition to being charged explicitly with implementing
paragraph 11 of Resolution 194, which recognizes the right
of return of Palestinian refugees, the UNCCP had a pro-
tection mandate toward Palestinian refugees (Kagan 2010).
With the cessation of the UNCCP’s activities, Palestinian
refugees came under the sole assistance of UNRWA, which
was only given a relief and welfare mandate.
Since the 1980s, protection duties have been progres-
sively added to UNRWA’s mandate (Kagan 2010; Schiff
1995), and in recent years UNRWA has played an “in-
creasingly visible role as a global advocate for the protec-
tion of Palestinian refugees” (Kagan 2010:518).11 Although
UNRWA now considers “promoting durable solutions” as
part of its protection duties, it limits itself to calling for
“a just resolution to the refugee question, and especially a
strong refugee representation in the peace process” (Kagan
2010:521). Refugee law scholar Michael Kagan argues that
“despite the gradual growth of UNRWA’s protection man-
date, a widely held agreement seems to be that UNRWA can
do relatively little to actually solve the Palestinian refugee
problem, because it is not part of the political apparatus that
seeks an end to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict” (2010:521).
From an international perspective, Palestinian refugees
have been largely marginalized by various political attempts
to solve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Dumper 2007). By
the time the Oslo peace process was acknowledged as a
failure in the late 1990s, many Palestinian refugees felt the
refugee issue had been sidestepped in the various peace
processes and resented the fact that concessions were be-
ing made on their behalf without their active participation
in peace talks (Dumper 2007). Additionally, Palestinian
refugees have been weakened politically with the creation
of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), which only
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represents Palestinians in theWest Bank and Gaza. Since the
1993 Oslo Accords, the PNA has been the main Palestinian
counterpart in Israeli–Palestinian peace talks as opposed to
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which rep-
resents all Palestinians. The considerable weakening of the
PLO has meant that “the direct channel of political represen-
tation for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and
in the diaspora has in effect withered” (Dumper 2007:65).
The current period, then, is one inwhichPalestinian refugees
have very little political clout in terms of influencing the ac-
tors directly involved in attempts to find a political solution
to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, including the refugee is-
sue.
Although not necessarily expecting UNRWA to solve
the refugee issue, Palestinian refugees are invested in the
agency’s continuation because it gives them visibility as
refugees and serves as a reminder that the international
community has yet to resolve their situation (see Al Husseini
and Bocco 2010). Palestinian refugees have a complex and
contradictory relationship with UNRWA, which translates
into a mixture of distrust, dissatisfaction, and attachment
toward the agency (see Schiff 1995). Although UNRWA’s
elision of the political roots of the Palestinian refugee issue
has always been a source of tension between the agency and
refugees (Schiff 1995), research conducted in 2006 shows
that, despite their criticisms, Palestinian refugees are al-
most unanimously attached to the continuation of UNRWA
(Nabulsi 2006).
While conducting fieldwork in Ein el Tal and Neirab,
I found that the majority of Palestinian refugees I talked
to highlighted UNRWA’s importance as a provider of social
services.However, some felt the agency should bemore sup-
portive politically, an opinion that oftenmeant thatUNRWA
should play an active role in defending the right of return
of Palestinian refugees. When I asked Samah, who is from
Neirab Camp and runs the UNRWA-sponsored Women’s
Program Center in the camp, what she thought UNRWA’s
role should be with regard to Palestinian refugees, she an-
swered:
UNRWA is the main service provider [for Palestinian refugees]
. . . Honestly, it should offer more services than it does right now,
because, honestly, it is decreasing services. For example, it should
expand its services in clinics: more doctors, more education and
health services; [UNRWA should] provide scholarships to study
abroad, secure work opportunities [for refugees]. . . . Also it
should have a political role. It should campaign and pressure the
United Nations about the right of return of refugees. [UNRWA’s]
role is reduced to a social and humanitarian one. [interview,
December 30, 2005]12
Although UNRWA is the most prominent organization in-
volved in providing social services to Palestinian refugees
living in camps, it is not the only one. In Palestinian refugee
camps, political parties play a major role in running char-
ities and overseeing social programs. In Ein el Tal Camp,
community-based charities are run by political parties such as
Hamas, Fatah, and the Islamic Jihad (UNRWA and TANGO
2005). Neirab has a kindergarten for low-income families
linked to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP). Some of the Palestinian political parties sponsor
youth groups. They sometimes have women’s committees
that are more or less active. Neirab Camp is also home to the
Palestinian CharitableOrganization (al-Jam‘iyya al-Khayriyya
al-Filastiniyya), which is run by a board consisting of Pales-
tinian representatives of the ruling Syrian Ba‘th party as well
as representatives of various Palestinian political parties and
by independent members (UNRWA and TANGO 2005).13
Thus, on the one hand, Palestinian political parties
whose rhetoric emphasizes Palestinian resistance, libera-
tion, and return play an important role in local attempts
to provide social services to camp dwellers. On the other
hand, UNRWA officially subscribes to a separation between
politics and the services it provides. In a recent speech,
UNRWACommissioner General FilippoGrandi argued that
UNRWA’s mission does not extend to “matters in the po-
litical realm.” He explained that UNRWA does not have the
power to “bring about Palestinian unity and the contiguity
of the West Bank and Gaza; an end to the occupation; a
negotiated conclusion of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict; the
establishment of a viable State of Palestine; and the realiza-
tion of a just and lasting solution to refugees’ plight” (Grandi
2010).
The following example, based on fieldwork con-
ducted in 2004 in the urban Palestinian refugee camp of
Yarmouk, illustrates the incompatibility of UNRWA’s self-
understanding as an apolitical organization and the politi-
cal ideology that permeates local Palestinian efforts to ad-
dress social vulnerability in the camps. One morning in
August of 2004, I met with a young foreign Damascus-based
UNRWA employee whowas interested in promoting activi-
ties for youth in the camps where he worked and establishing
spaces for cooperation between locally run organizations in
the camps and UNRWA.He had offeredme the opportunity
to accompany him to a meeting with the members of the
YarmoukYouthCenter, a youth center based inYarmouk, an
“unofficial” camp that was established by the Syrian govern-
ment in the 1950s.14 The Yarmouk Youth Center is linked
to one of the many political parties based in Yarmouk Camp.
Whenwe arrived, a group of young Palestinian men and
women in their late teens and early twentieswere in themid-
dle of aworkshopwith European youth as part of an exchange
program sponsored by a Belgian NGO. Palestinian refugees
from other camps in Syria as well as camps in Lebanon were
also participating in the exchange. Taking a break from their
activities, members of the Yarmouk Youth Center and some
of their European and Palestinian guests sat in a circle with
us, and the UNRWA employee proceeded to ask them how
UNRWA could help them with their social activities. The
conversation quickly turned into a list of grievances against
UNRWA.Palestinian participants felt thatUNRWAservices
had declined in the camps in the Damascus and Aleppo ar-
eas. One participant complained that UNRWA schools were
overcrowded, limiting students’ ability to learn basic skills
such as reading. Another lamented the fact thatUNRWAhad
stopped distributing free school supplies such as notebooks
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and pencils. He also complained that Palestinian refugees
were not allowed to bring up topics relating to Palestinian
nationalism in UNRWA classrooms. A participant who was
visiting from one of the refugee camps in Lebanon criticized
UNRWA for not covering surgery costs for refugees and for
not doing enough to improve the infrastructure of various
camps. Finally, a participant complained that UNRWA was
under the influence of the U.S. government (which happens
to be UNRWA’s biggest donor).
The UNRWA employee tried to address every com-
plaint. With regard to restrictions on Palestinian national-
ism in UNRWA classrooms and undue U.S. influence on
URNWA, he simply replied in English that UNRWA is “a
humanitarian organization that does not interfere [in] poli-
tics.” To this, the Palestinian participantwho had complained
about U.S. influence on the agency replied in Arabic, “but
the United States interferes in everything!” [bas Amrika bti-
dakhal bi-kill shi‘!], drawing laughs from the rest of the group
(field notes, September 8, 2004).
It is difficult for UNRWA, which operates under the
presumption of apoliticalness, to establish strong relation-
ships with grassroots Palestinian organizations and refugees
in general because the latter do not operate under the as-
sumption that the humanitarian and the political are two sep-
arate spheres. A few months after my visit to the Yarmouk
YouthCenter, the sameUNRWAemployee and I became in-
volved in the planning of an UNRWA andUNDP-sponsored
(UNDevelopment Programme) celebration of International
Volunteer Day. The two-day celebration ended with a fair
featuring local and international organizations involved in a
variety of social issues as well as the cultural centers of sev-
eral countries promoting their social activities.UNRWAand
UNDP officials supervising the planning of the International
Volunteer Day celebration were worried that the Yarmouk
Youth Center, which was participating in the event, might
use the celebration to focus attention on political grievances
in connectionwith the Israeli–Palestinian conflict or the right
of return. They therefore made it clear to the center that
they did not want any political messages in its display.
The time to set up for the International Volunteer Day
fair eventually came. The youth center’s display consisted of
Palestinian embroidery, pictures drawn by children attend-
ing the center’s programs, and posters. Among the posters
was a bright red one advertizing the center’s volunteer-
taught classes for camp children, a theme that fit perfectly
with the goals of the UN volunteer-day fair. However, in
the middle of the bright red poster was the image of a
Palestinian fighter wearing a keffiyeh (traditional Arab head-
dress that has become a Palestinian national symbol) along
with theword Intifada in big capital letters. The poster imme-
diately attracted the attention of a high-ranking Palestinian
UNRWA employee, who demanded that the center take it
down while he inspected the rest of the display. The center
complied but managed to keep other posters in its display.
One poster featured a giant greywall with unfamiliar writing
on it. I later found out that the slogan carved across the wall
in big black capital letterswasDutch for “take down thewall”
(sloop de muur), a reference to the Israeli-built barrier along
the Occupied Territories (field notes, January 4, 2005).
The foreign UNRWA employee who had introduced
me to the Yarmouk Youth Center was furious. He felt that
the leaders of the youth center had been offered an excellent
chance to work with UNRWA, which would have pro-
vided them with opportunities to strengthen their center,
but they had wasted this opportunity by using the Interna-
tional Volunteer Day fair as a political platform. Hewas very
disappointed in the center and vowed never to work with
its members again.
The views of the leaders of the Yarmouk Youth Center
were more nuanced. Although they were frustrated with
UNRWA’s censorship of their display, Ibrahim, one of the
center’s leaders, made sure I understood that “UNRWA is
not our enemy” (field notes, January 4, 2005). According
to Ibrahim, the center did not necessarily see the agency as
working against it, but URNWA definitely had a different
strategy with regard to helping Palestinian refugees, and
working too closely with UNRWA could be harmful to the
center’s interests.
One factor that helps make sense of the mixed feel-
ings displayed by the youth center’s leaders is the fact
that roughly 99 percent of UNRWA employees are them-
selves Palestinian refugees (Farah 2010). Thus, there is a
significant overlap between UNRWA and the refugees for
whom it was created. It is important to note however that
foreigners—usually Westerners—hold the reigns of power
in the agency, as they fillUNRWA’s top leadership positions.
In his 1995 study on UNRWA, political scientist Benjamin
Schiff notes that “the internationals are supposed to main-
tain the agency’s political neutrality, uphold management
standards, and intervene with the host/occupying govern-
ments (in ways Palestinians, subject to local laws and po-
litical constraints, could not) when necessary” (1995:148).
He also notes that “the leading local staff had to tread care-
fully between commitments to the Palestinians and loyal-
ties and duties to UNRWA” (Schiff 1995:145). On the one
hand, Palestinian UNRWA employees can be seen as in-
termediaries who make the agency’s supposedly apolitical
policies more palatable to Palestinian refugees, as in the
case of the Palestinian employee who demanded that the
Yarmouk Youth Center take down one of its posters. On
the other hand, Palestinian UNRWA employees can also be
seen as inserting the agency’s programs in narratives that
accommodate Palestinian nationalism and political claims.
For example, referring to UNRWA schools in Jordan (the
majority of UNRWA teachers are Palestinian), anthropolo-
gist Randa Farah notes that lessons in Palestinian nationalism
and history “went beyondwhatwas required in the Jordanian
curriculum, and in fact contravened UNRWA and State reg-
ulations,” which attested to “the failure of UNRWA to mute
the political dimension of refugee histories or to generate
complacency” (2010:403).
With regard to the Neirab Rehabilitation Project,
UNRWA’s Palestinian employees played a useful role in
garnering community support for the project. However,
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contrary to their foreign counterparts, it was not unusual
for Palestinian UNRWA employees to go beyond the tech-
nocratic language of the project and openly acknowledge
Palestinian political claims when addressing local concerns.
This will become clearer in subsequent sections. To under-
stand the controversies surrounding the Neirab Rehabilita-
tion Project, it is necessary to first understand the signifi-
cance of relief-centered humanitarianism to the relationship
betweenUNRWA and Palestinian refugees. It is to this topic
that I now turn.
HUMANITARIAN AID AS A RIGHT
In Syria, only six percent of refugees continue to receive
humanitarian aid in the form of rations and other direct
handouts (Takkenberg 2010), but many of the refugees I
interacted with were critical about the progressive cuts in
UNRWA rations. Even refugees who do not need rations
or other handouts from UNRWA often deplore UNRWA’s
cuts. Bilal, a construction worker in Ein el Tal Camp who
was probably in his mid-thirties, opposed UNRWA’s cuts,
explaining that “we never took flour. My father was a gov-
ernment employee, and government employees don’t take
flour. But I defend the distribution of flour so that we remain
refugees” (interview, June 21, 2005).
In her analysis of humanitarian practices in Gaza in the
aftermath of the 1948 war, anthropologist Ilana Feldman
argues that rations, which from the perspective of human-
itarian agencies were a response to the extreme poverty
of Palestinian refugees following the loss of their homes
and livelihoods, paradoxically played a central role in the
emergence of the refugee as a political figure in Palestinian
discourse. Rations functioned not simply as a tool of human-
itarian aid but also as proof of the loss of one’s home and,
consequently, as proof of one’s identity as a refugee. This
would create a situation in which “Palestinians quickly came
to see this aid, not as charity, but as a right: a reflection
of international responsibility for their condition” (Feldman
2007a:144).
Many of today’s human rights documents acknowledge
human rights as a question of responsibilities (on the part
of individuals, states, or international bodies) as well as
individual—and sometimes group—entitlements (Donnelly
2003; Hastrup 2001). This includes the responsibility of
states “to provide certain (civil, political, economic, and
cultural) goods, services and opportunities” to individuals
under their jurisdiction (Donnelly 2003:36). Arguing that
UNRWA has taken on many of the functions attributed
to the governments of states, scholars have characterized
UNRWA as a surrogate or quasi state for Palestinian
refugees, a “welfare government in exile” (Al Husseini and
Bocco 2010; Farah 2010:391).However, the right to aid that
is claimed by Palestinian refugees does not derive primarily
from their relationship to UNRWA as a surrogate state or
from the content of global human rights instruments. This
right cannot be reduced to a question of responsibility to
provide particular services to individuals who need them;
rather, Palestinian refugees conceptualize their right to aid
as a question of historical responsibility and accountability
on the part of the international community.
Anthropologists have argued that rights cannot simply
be treated as a by-product of Western modernity or West-
ern colonization (Subramanian 2009; Wilson 1997). Thus,
Ajantha Subramanian points out that “rights claims are em-
bedded in dense histories of struggle and, in this sense, are
not distinct from other cultural expressions of relationality
and obligation” (2009:21). Palestinian refugees’ conception
of UNRWA aid as a right does not emanate directly from
international human rights law but, rather, is grounded in
a larger sense of historical injustice. From the perspective
of Palestinian refugees, not only did the United Nations,
through its partition plan, set in motion the events that
led to their forced displacement and dispossession, but it
also failed to remedy this situation by ensuring their return
once hostilities had subsided (see Peteet 2005). According
to this perspective, UNRWA’ s responsibility to attend to
the welfare of refugees is a question of historical and polit-
ical accountability, the price the United Nations must pay
for its failure to find a solution to the Palestinian refugee
issue. One way that Palestinian refugees conceive of this
failure is to point to the United Nations’ inability to im-
plement Resolution 194, which aimed to solve the refugee
question. In this sense, UNRWA has also become a symbol
of international legal responsibility for finding a solution to
the forced displacement of Palestinian refugees. Rations and
other handouts and the health clinics and schools the agency
operates have become, for refugees, the material embod-
iment of UNRWA’s responsibility to assist refugees until
their situation is resolved politically.
Thus, there is a way in which the return claims of Pales-
tinian refugees have become embedded in their everyday
suffering. The following example illustrates the way the ev-
eryday hardship that the Neirab Rehabilitation Projects seeks
to end paradoxically operates as a political ally in Palestinian
refugees’ resolve not to forget the past. One morning in
December of 2005, I accompanied an assistant to the Neirab
Rehabilitation Project who wanted to meet with newly ar-
rived families from the Neirab barracks and see how they
were adjusting to their new life in Ein el Tal. The newly
arrived inhabitants were happy to now be living in spacious
houses with yards but had many complaints with regard
to the infrastructure work, which was significantly behind
schedule. Because of delays in providing all of the newhouses
with water, a truck had been hired to deliver water daily
to the houses not yet connected to the water network. Ac-
cording to the new residents, the truck came at most twice
a week, forcing some of them to go to neighbors’ houses for
showers. There was also no system of trash collection set in
place for the new housing, causing trash to accumulate and
resulting in health problems for the new residents. Finally,
in the process of extending the sewage system to the new
houses, sewage water had mixed with the tap water, again
compromising the newcomers’ health. The new residents
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were clearly upset at having to face these problems when the
main reason formoving to the new housing was to escape the
harsh and unhealthy living conditions of the Neirab barracks.
However, one young man, after explaining that he had to go
to his neighbor’s home to bathe his children, added, “Maybe
it’s better this way, that we are still suffering. Maybe this
way we won’t forget Palestine” (field notes, December 23,
2005). The young father’s words are indicative of how on-
going rupture becomes a way of remembering the original
moment of rupture located in the past (Mehta and Chatterji
2001; Sa’di and Abu-Lughod 2007). His words also point to
the tension between the desire to overcome the traumatic
past and at the same time hold on to it in the name of redress.
The significance of suffering to the lives and experi-
ences of Palestinian refugees cannot simply be reduced to a
question of political instrumentality. Suffering also has exis-
tential dimensions and, in the Palestinian case, is meaningful
to refugees’ sense of identity and history. However, it is
important to note the political dimensions of suffering in
the case of Palestinian refugees, because given their cur-
rent lack of political clout and their political marginalization
in various international attempts at resolving the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict, suffering seems to be the main channel
through which refugees can make their claims visible to the
international community.
Scholars have argued that with the emergence of a global
humanitarian regime in the 20th century, moral imperatives
connected to the effort of saving lives or alleviating suffering
tend to become a substitute for political action (Fassin 2002;
Morris 2008a; Ticktin 2006). With regard to the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict, anthropologist Lori Allen (2009) argues
that the display through visual media of suffering, blood-
ied, and mangled Palestinian bodies has become a means
for Palestinians in the Occupied Territories to communicate
their humanity and the justice of their cause to the outside
world. For their part, Dider Fassin and Richard Rechtman
(2009) note that although Palestinian refugees in the Occu-
pied Territories have adequate local medical services, they
solicit the presence of humanitarian organizations such as
Me´decins Sans Frontie`res (Doctors without Borders, MSF)
because they value the role that such organizations play as
witnesses of their plight under Israeli occupation.
Similarly, given that in the current world order the
refugee is primarily recognizable in terms of material and
bodily distress (Arendt 1973; Malkki 1996), UNRWA’s
minimalist relief-centered humanitarianism highlights the
refugee status of Palestinian refugees and thus keeps open
the issue of return. TheNeirab Rehabilitation Project, which
is concerned with the long-term well-being of Palestinian
refugees in Ein el Tal and Neirab and with making drastic
changes to Ein el Tal and Neirab’s infrastructure, raises
for refugees the issue of how to remain visible as vic-
tims of forced displacement. In the next section, I take
a closer look at the Neirab Rehabilitation Project and the
political implications of UNRWA’s growing emphasis on
“development.”
THE NEIRAB REHABILITATION PROJECT
In June of 2004, UNRWA and the Swiss Agency for De-
velopment and Cooperation (SDC) convened an interna-
tional conference featuring 67 countries and 34 intergov-
ernmental organizations in Geneva, Switzerland, to address
UNRWA’s ongoing funding crisis and devise new strategies
for improving the lives of Palestinian refugees (UNRWA
2004). Shortly after the 2004 Geneva conference, UNRWA
finalized a “Medium Term Plan,” which had been the subject
of review and discussion at the conference. This Medium
Term Plan was presented in 2005 as UNRWA’s effort “to
restore the living conditions of Palestine refugees to ac-
ceptable international standards and set them on the road to
self reliance and sustainable human development” (UNRWA
2005:2). After the 2004Geneva Conference, theNeirab Re-
habilitation Project, which was initially limited to improving
housing conditions in Neirab’s barracks, officially became a
comprehensive “development” project focusing on infras-
tructural as well as socioeconomic conditions in both Ein
el Tal and Neirab camps. The Neirab Rehabilitation Project
also became a pilot forUNRWA’s implementation of its new
Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Program, which was
institutionalized in 2006 (Al Husseini 2010).
As others have pointed out, no objective definition
of the term humanitarianism exists, and humanitarianism’s
boundaries have historically been fluid (Calhoun 2008; Feld-
man 2007b). In the 1990s, humanitarianism went through
significant transformations, and the issue of where to
draw the boundaries of humanitarian action has become
the subject of intense debate (Barnett and Weiss 2008;
Chandler 2001; Kennedy 2004; Rieff 2002; Terry 2002).
Since the late 1980s, the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) definition of humanitarianism—predicated on
“the impartial, independent, and neutral provision of re-
lief to those in immediate need because of conflict and
natural disasters”—has ceased to be the industry stan-
dard (Barnett and Weiss 2008:5). Humanitarianism can
now be understood to include a whole range of activi-
ties including development, human rights, democracy pro-
motion, gender equality, peace building, and even mili-
tary intervention (Barnett and Weiss 2008; Calhoun 2008;
Chandler 2001).
Within the aid industry, however, humanitarian aid is
distinguished from development aid (Fearon 2008). Human-
itarian aid, on the one hand, tends to be associated with the
attempt to alleviate suffering and save lives within the con-
text of an “emergency” situation that typically emanates from
natural or manmade disasters or from the use of organized
violence (Calhoun 2008; Fearon 2008). Development aid,
on the other hand, is generally associated with improving
the normal state of affairs (Fearon 2008).
In the last decade, UN humanitarian agencies such as
UNRWA and UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UN-
HCR) have placed increased emphasis on “development” as
an important aspect of assistance to refugees living in pro-
tracted situations (with respect to UNHCR, see Crisp 2003;
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Meyer 2006; UNHCR 2003). Thus, UNRWA’s recent em-
phasis on development can be understood as part of a broader
shift within the United Nations (see Misselwitz and Hanafi
2010) and as part of a broader global shift characterized by
the expansion of the field of humanitarianism.
As argued by anthropologist Jim Ferguson, development
relies on two meanings that are often conflated: on the one
hand, development means a process of transition “toward a
modern, capitalist, industrial economy—‘modernization,’
‘capitalist development,’ ‘the development of the forces of
production’ etc.” (1994:15). On the other hand, it can be
understood as any form of intervention aiming to improve
quality of life and alleviate poverty. Additionally, critics
of development have pointed to development’s roots in
Western modernity, which can be understood in terms of
a universalist and unilinial vision of progress informed by
technological and scientific advancement and predicated on
a radical break with the past (Cowan and Shenton 1996;
Crush 1995; Escobar 1995; Koselleck 2004).
When interacting with refugees, the project team
avoided talking about development in broad terms as the
modernization of the camps, because such an understanding
was more amenable to the rumor that the goal of the project
was a way of solving the refugee issue economically. Indeed,
in the early days of the Neirab Rehabilitation Project, one
of the negative rumors making the rounds in Ein el Tal was
that UNRWA’s emphasis on development was a sign that
the agency saw the future well-being of Palestinians as firmly
grounded in Syria; that the project was really a “settlement
project” (mashru’ tawtin) and that development was a way
for the international community to make the camps—and
by extension the Palestinian refugee issue—disappear. An-
other rumor circulating in Ein el Tal and Neirab was that the
Neirab Rehabilitation Project’s Western donors were sup-
porting the project because they believed that Palestinian
refugees would forget about the right of return once they
started leading comfortable lives.
The following interaction with a young Palestinian doc-
tor fromEin el Talwhowas adamantly opposed to theNeirab
Rehabilitation Project illustrates some of the resistance that
UNRWA was facing in the spring of 2005. As we stood in
the yard of his house, he pointed to the new yellow hilltop
houses where some 30 families from the Neirab barracks had
already moved and asked me, “Do you know what we call
it? ‘The settlement’ (al-mustawtana). Stop anybody walking
toward the hilltop and ask him, ‘Where are you going?’ He
will answer, ‘To the settlement.’” He pointed to the fact
that two of the main donors to the project were the United
States and Canada, two countries with close ties to the Israeli
government. In his opinion, the project was a plan skillfully
designed by Israel’s allies to ease people’s hardships so that
they would stop thinking about return. “For sure, the chil-
dren who will grow up in the new houses will forget,” he
insisted (field notes, May 23, 2005).
Tocounter settlement rumors,UNRWAofficials down-
played infrastructural improvements, arguing that the main
goal of the project was to provide Palestinians in Ein el
Tal and Neirab with “portable” skills that they could take
with them anywhere. As we sat in her office at UNRWA’s
Damascus headquarters one morning in April of 2006,
the British head of the social development component of
the Neirab Rehabilitation Project explained UNRWA’s ap-
proach to development: “If I constantly give you something,
you’re always going to need me to give you something.
If I build your skills and your own resources and capaci-
ties, that’s something that always stays with you.” Thus, the
British UNRWA employee explained UNRWA’s develop-
ment strategy in individual and moral terms as a process
through which Palestinian refugees would acquire valuable
skills that would empower them to be self-reliant and to
make the best of any environment.
Despite emphasizing that the ultimate goal of the Neirab
Rehabilitation Project was to empower refugees by helping
them acquire valuable portable skills rather than thoroughly
modernizing the landscape of the camps, URNWA employ-
ees had to choose their words carefully when discussing the
Neirab Rehabilitation Project with community members,
even those who ostensibly supported the project. In the
spring of 2005, during a training of about 30 local Pales-
tinian volunteers who were of varying ages and included
six women, Rana, an UNRWA project assistant in her mid-
twenties who is half-Palestinian, was abruptly interrupted
by one of the volunteers as she went over the project’s
sustainable-development approach in Arabic. She had been
explaining that, among other benefits, the project would
provide people in the community with skills that would
stay with them “forever” (lil-abad) when a young man asked,
“Why forever?” Rana, who right away understood that the
word forever and its implication of permanence had disturbed
the volunteer, clarified that the goal of the project was not
to create a better life for Palestinians so they would stay (in
Syria). They would be able to take the skills and empower-
ment they would receive through the project with them, she
said, presumably alluding to return. “And do you think that
once you return, your problems will be over? This project
will empower you to deal [with them],” she added (field
notes, April 26, 2005).
Later, I had a conversation with UNRWA’s Aleppo
“area officer,” a Palestinian refugee from Neirab Camp, a
few months before he went into retirement. When I men-
tioned the rumors that the Neirab Rehabilitation Project was
conceived by the international community as an alternative
to return, he replied that the project was “about improving
and developing housing conditions and is not connected to
settlement in any way.” Subscribing to a modernist and uni-
versalist understanding of “development,” he further argued
that development was actually useful to the realization of
return:
When the skills and experience and empowerment and training
improve the person, he canmove them from one place to another.
He can move them to Palestine with him when refugees return.
Should he stay here and remain a backwards person? When he
finally gets to return to Palestine, he will find the rest of the world
400 years ahead! [interview with author, September 1, 2005]
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The notion that development was amenable and even useful
to Palestinian political claims had been used by GAPAR’s
Palestinian director to rally local support for the Neirab
Rehabilitation Project. This notion was further echoed by
Atif, a 19-year-old Palestinian welder from Neirab who
worked as a volunteer on the Neirab Rehabilitation Project
andwas amember of theDemocratic Front for theLiberation
of Palestine (DFLP). As we sat in a cafe´ in Aleppo, he
dismissed settlement rumors and explained that he supports
development
because this gives us the ability to support our issues, our projects,
from a nationalist and political perspective. Let us start with the
housing situation: if I get married and I have seven children . . .
maybe I am preparing something political that serves our cause
(qadiyatna). If the household becomes bigger, the ability to work
on this project (mawdu’) is restrained, but if I have a bigger house,
I can set aside a room for this project. So [my goal] has a greater
ability to be achieved. [interview, November 7, 2005]
CONCLUSION
Palestinian refugees living in camps have a history of resist-
ing long-term“improvement” projects targeting their camps.
These projects have usually been funded by foreign donors
and have fallen “within the parameters of Western and in-
ternational aid agencies” (Al Husseini 2010; Dumper 2007;
Feldman 2008; Peteet 2005:67; Schiff 1995). Refugee resis-
tance has been because of fears that these projects were be-
ing undertaken as an alternative to return or that supporting
these projects would signal refugee openness to permanent
resettlement as themain solution to their situation. At times,
as in the case of UNRWA’s regional economic development
schemes in the 1950s, these fears have been well founded.
However, according to Jalal Al Husseini, the fact that Pales-
tinian refugees have ultimately allowed UNRWA’s recent
Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Program to proceed
in camps such as Neirab, Nahr el Bared (Lebanon), and Jenin
(West Bank) is a sign that “the refugees no longer see the
sustainable improvement of their living conditions as unal-
terably incompatible with the right of return” (2010:17).
Al Husseini nevertheless recognizes “persisting fears among
camp residents that UNRWA’s developmental designs con-
ceal dubious political motivations—namely the silent bury-
ing of the right of return” (2010:18).
This continuing tension that refugees face between “a
genuine desire for sustainable improvement in their living
conditions” (Al Husseini 2010:20) and fears that such sus-
tainable improvements might come at the expense of their
political claims was clearly noticeable during my latest visit
to Ein el Tal in October of 2010. Wisam, who used to
live in the Neirab barracks and was part of the first group
of 30 families to move to newly built UNRWA houses in
Ein el Tal in 2003, took me through the process that had
led to the painting of the mural in 2009. As we sat in the
living room of his new two-bedroom house with his wife,
daughter-in-law, and some neighbors who were visiting,
Wisam explained that residents of the newly built UNRWA
houses had gotten together and commissioned a well-known
artist in the camp to paint the mural. Once the mural was
finished, the families invited Syrian government representa-
tives (GAPAR employees) and UNRWA representative to
its unveiling ceremony. According toWisam, the mural was
a message directed at the project’s international donors:
[The Neirab Rehabilitation Project] is an improvement project
(mashru’ tahsin). The Europeans (the donors) call it an improve-
ment project, but they think that maybe the Palestinians will for-
get. They (the donors) gave [the Palestinians] big houses; maybe in
ten, twenty years, the Palestinians will forget the right of return.
We say “no”: These houses don’t replace the right of return. The
right of return [as stated in UN] Resolution 194 is a personal right
(haqq shakhsi). No one can take it away. [interview, October 6,
2010]
Wisam, who apparently played an active role in the cre-
ation of the mural, has been and continues to be a strong
supporter of the Neirab Rehabilitation Project: “I am with
development, improvement (tatwir, tahsin),” he told me,
adding that “this is a human right (haqq insani).” What he
is against, as are the vast majority of Palestinians in Ein el
Tal and Neirab, is development censoring or compromising
Palestinian political claims.
Palestinian refugees have been able to reinsert the de-
politicized humanitarian relief provided by UNRWA over
the years into a political narrative that views this aid as the
symbol of continued international responsibility for find-
ing a satisfactory political solution to their predicament.
UNRWA’s growing emphasis on development articulated
around notions such as “self-reliance” and ending refugees’
“dependence” on assistance contradicts this narrative. Fur-
thermore, the return claims of Palestinian refugees have
paradoxically become embedded in the material suffering
that UNRWA-sponsored development seeks to eradicate.
There is an emerging narrative among Palestinian
refugees actively involved in the Neirab Rehabilitation
Project, either as UNRWA employees, project volunteers,
or Syrian government representatives, that is attempting to
reconcile “development” in the camps with Palestinian ad-
vocacy for the right of return. This narrative conceives of
material suffering as an obstacle to refugees pursuing their
political goals. It concurrently reinterprets “development”
not as the end goal of the Neirab Rehabilitation Project but
as a means to personal and collective empowerment that
can be harnessed toward the goal of return. Whether this
narrative will take hold across Ein el Tal andNeirab or across
the larger refugee community living in camps remains to be
seen. The mural in Ein el Tal, however, is an indication of
Palestinian refugees’ continued insistence on inserting their
political claims within the dehistoricizing and depoliticizing
discourse of international aid.
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1. When I talk about UNRWA’s relief-centered services, I use
the word relief in the broad sense of “public assistance.”
2. Formal interviews carried out with Ein el Tal and Neirab resi-
dents involved mostly individuals who worked with the Neirab
Rehabilitation Project as volunteers.
3. These numbers are based on estimates from the United Nations
Economic Survey Mission (see Takkenberg 1998) as well as es-
timates from historian Benny Morris (2004). With regard to
referring to these events as “the first Arab–Israeli war,” Morris
points out that violence and “escalation towards full-scale civil
war” began in December of 1947, involving armed Palestinian
Arab groups and Jewish paramilitary groups such as the Ha-
ganah, Irgun, and Stern Gang and prompting an initial wave of
“Arab exodus” (estimated to be in the tens of thousands and
largely restricted to other parts of Palestine) during the period
of December of 1947 to March of 1948 (Morris 2004:65).
4. Historian Benny Morris notes that conquered Arab villages
were often razed to the ground; in the case of towns and villages
that were depopulated of Arabs but not destroyed, the govern-
ment installed newly arrived Jewish immigrants in the emptied
houses; Arab-owned fieldswere also destroyed or taken over by
Israeli authorities, and new settlements were started on Arab-
owned land; finally, Palestinians who attempted to “infiltrate”
their former towns or villages were “routinely rounded up and
expelled” (Morris 2004:589).
5. The Syrian government’s accommodating approach toward
Palestinian refugees can be explained by two main factors:
first, Palestinian refugees in Syria have never constituted more
than three to four percent of the population and, contrary to
Jordan and Lebanon, were not seen as a threat to Syrian em-
ployment or natural resources (Al Husseini and Bocco 2010;
Kodmani-Darwish 1997; Takkenberg 1998). Second, Palestine
was historically a part of the Ottoman-controlled territory of
“Bilad el Sham” (“Greater Syria,” i.e., the lands of Damascus)
in Arabic (Seale 1988). A reunited Bilad el Sham in the wake
of colonial amputation was central to the Syrian national imag-
inary in the decades following Syrian independence in 1946
(Talhami 2001).
6. In practice, Law No. 260 means that Palestinian refugees have
the same rights as Syrians, except for the right to own agricul-
tural land, ownmore than one house, or vote in Syrian national
elections (Takkenberg 1998).
7. Personal communication with UNRWA official (March 15,
2011).
8. The UNCCP has never been formally abolished.
9. Paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 issued by the UN General
Assembly on December 11, 1948, “resolves that the refugees
wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their
neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest prac-
ticable date, and that compensations should be paid for the
property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or
damage to property which, under principles of international
law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or
authorities responsible” (United Nations 1948).
10. Although in 1950, the office of the UNHigh Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) was created to assist all refugees, Pales-
tinian refugees were not absorbed into it. This was primarily
because of strong opposition from a number of Arab states at
the 1951Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
who feared that the prospect of Palestinian refugees’ return to
their homes would be undermined if Palestinian refugees were
subsumed under UNHCR’s mandate along with other cate-
gories of refugees (Takkenberg 1998).
11. According toUNRWAconsultantNicholasMorris,UNRWA’s
protection activities now include promoting a just and durable
solution, promoting refugee-respecting policies by host gov-
ernments or occupying powers, delivering services in a rights-
respecting manner, and integrating protection approaches in
all aspects of programming (Morris 2008b).
12. I have changed the names of all the individuals I interviewed to
protect their identities.
13. Ba‘th means “resurrection” in English.
14. I have changed the name of the youth center to protect its
identity.
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